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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most controversial measures considered by the Louisiana
Legislature during the 2000 Regular Session was Senate Bill Number 1,' which was
proposed to amend the Louisiana Constitution to repeal the severance tax imposed
on the extraction of oil and gas in Louisiana2 and to commence levying a tax on the
use of hydrocarbon processing facilities located in Louisiana. The hydrocarbon
processing tax concept was opposed by the oil and gas industry that declared that
the new tax "would add a cost to their operations that would make their products
uncompetitive and speed the decline of the refining industry in Louisiana. '
Proponents hailed the hydrocarbons processing tax as the answer to Louisiana's
recurring fiscal problems, noting that "[a]fter accounting for the elimination of
severance taxes, the state would have about $700 million a year to take care of the
budget problems and education, including teacher pay raises."4
Both sides made presentations to the Louisiana State Law Institute Tax Study
Committee' that was charged with the responsibility to "study and investigate
particular areas of tax laws in Louisiana at the direction of and in consultation with
the joint committee (House Ways and Means/Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs)
and report to the joint committee in the manner and as requested by the joint
committee." Ultimately, the Tax Study Committee rejected the hydrocarbon
processing tax idea.'
Louisiana's recent effort to impose a tax on hydrocarbon processing in
Louisiana was not new. It had its vestiges in two failed past efforts to implement
such a tax-the 1978 "First Use Tax"' and the 1982 "Coastal Wetlands
Environmental Levy" ("CWEL").9  The former measure was declared
Copyright 200 1, by LOUISIANA LAW REviEw.
Shareholder, Liskow & Lewis, A Professional Law Corporation, New Orleans, Louisiana.
I. S.B. 1, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2000).
2. Id. at Art. VII, § 4(B); La. R.S. 47:631 (2000).
3. Carl Redman, Tax PlansAdvanceat Capitol, Baton Rouge MomingAdvocate,May 24,2000,
at 6A.
4. Id.
5. The Committee was born out of S. Con. Res. No. 88, 1999 Leg. Reg. Sess. (La. 1999).
Executive Director of the Louisiana State Law Institute William Crawford assembled an eighteen
member volunteer Tax Study Committee chaired by former Louisiana Senate President Randy Ewing.
The Tax Study Committee was composed of academics, business and tax lawyers, certified public
accountants, economists, lobbyists and businessmen from around the state.
6. Id.
7. Carl Redman, Plan Would Change Taxes for Business, Consumers, Baton Rouge Morning
Advocate, Apr. 27, 2000 at 4A.
8. 1978 La. Acts No. 294, codified at La. R.S. 47:1301 (1990).
9. La. H.R. 1660, 8th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1982).
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unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Louisiana.'°
The litter measure did not make it out of the 1982 Regular Session of the Louisiana
Legislature." The 2000 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature likewise
rejected Senate Bill Number 1.12
Despite the defeat of Senate Bill Number 1, few observers believe a tax levied
on hydrocarbon processing is dead. Because of its potential economic impact on
the State of Louisiana, the concept of a hydrocarbon processing tax will
undoubtedly be refined and reintroduced again. Pretermitting the political and
economic soundness of Senate Bill Number 1, passing contemporary constitutional
muster remains one of the formidable obstacles to future efforts to levy a tax on
hydrocarbon processing in Louisiana.
Evaluating the constitutionality of a hydrocarbon processing tax begins with
an understanding of the approach taken in Senate Bill Number 1. Its drafters
attempted to address the constitutional infirmities of the First Use Tax identified in
Maryland v. Louisiana and the academic debate surrounding the constitutionality
of CWEL. Whether those remedial measures would have been sufficient for Senate
Bill Number 1 to sustain a constitutional challenge requires an appreciation of the
development of the jurisprudence surrounding federal constitutional limitations on
a state's authority to tax over the past two decades. After a survey of this
jurisprudence, one can then frame and measure the constitutional issues emanating
from Senate Bill Number 1.
II. THE TAXING SCHEMES
A. Scope and Characteristics of the Hydrocarbon Processing Tax
The scope of the hydrocarbon processing tax was intended to extend to the "use
of hydrocarbon processing facilities in Louisiana by the owners of the hydrocarbons
processed therein."' 3 The term "use of hydrocarbon processing facilities" was
defined as processing, or causing to be processed, hydrocarbons in a hydrocarbon
processing facility in Louisiana.' The term "hydrocarbon processing facility"
meant any plant, building, construction, structure, or equipment located in
Louisiana and used to perform all or part of the processes, procedures, or operations
involved in "hydrocarbon processing."' 5 However, the terms did not include motor
10. 451 U.S.725,101S.Ct.2114(1981).
11. Ernest L. Edwards, Jr. et al., ConstitutionalandPolicy Implications ofLouisiana 'sProposed
Environmental Energy Tax: Political Expediency or Effective Regulation, 58 Tul. L. Rev. 215, 219
(1983) [hereinafter Edwards].
12. See supra note 1. After significant amendments, progress on Senate Bill Number I halted on
June 1, 2000 with a 17 yeas, 22 nays by Senate floor vote on final passage.
13. S.B. 1, 2000 Leg., Reg. Sess., § 4.1(A)(1) (La. 2000).
14. Id.at§4.1(E)(1l).
15. Id. at § 4.l(E)(6).
[Vol. 61
JAMES C EXNICIOS
vehicles, railway cars, ships, barges, or vessels. 6 "Hydrocarbon processing" was
broadly defined to include any process, procedure, or operation by which a
hydrocarbon or mixture of hydrocarbons undergoes any one of more than thirty
specifically described events in Louisiana, ranging from very specific and complex
chemical treatments such as catalytic reactions to very general physical processes
such as measurement by pressure, velocity, or flow.17 The direct venting or flaring
into the atmosphere of gas produced from oil and gas wells was specifically
excluded from the definition of "hydrocarbon processing."'
s
The term "owner" referred to the person or persons having title to the
hydrocarbons at the time they are processed in hydrocarbon processing facilities in
Louisiana. 9 The term "hydrocarbon" was specifically defined as a chemical
compound containing atoms of both carbon and hydrogen, including, but not
limited to crude oil, condensate, natural gas, natural gas liquids, and any refined
petroleum products.2" The term "hydrocarbon" specifically excluded
petrochemicals, coal, lignite, materials derived from agriculture or forestry
products, or nitrogenous fertilizers.2 "Refined petroleum products" included any
substances derived from refining petroleum which have commercial value such as
oils, gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, naphtha, kerosene or asphalts.22 The term
"petrochemicals" meant any products other than refited petroleum products and
were typically single chemical compounds produced from a chemical process in
which petroleum was used.'
The tax was to be levied at the rate of six cents per thousand cubic feet of
natural gas and natural gas liquids which undergo hydrocarbon processing in a
hydrocarbon processing facility within Louisiana.' It was to be levied at the rate
of $1.25 per barrel of condensate, crude oil, and natural gas liquids or condensate
contained therein, which had undergone hydrocarbon processing in a hydrocarbon
processing facility within Louisiana.2' The rate was 1.15 times the rate for crude
oil, per barrel of refined petroleum products that underwent hydrocarbon processing
in a hydrocarbon processing facility.26 The initial rates of the tax were to be only
a floor and would have been indexed and adjusted annually based on the price of
hydrocarbons during the previous year. The rates would have only been reduced
below the floor rates upon a vote of two-thirds of the Legislature.2" The Legislature
16. Id.
17. Id. at § 4.1 (EX5).
18. Id.
19. Id. at § 4.1(E)(8).
20. Id. at § 4.1(EX4Xa).
21. Id. at § 4.1(E)(4)(b).
22. Id. at § 4.1(E)(4Xa).
23. Id. at § 4.1 (EX4)(b). These products are generally used as materials in the manufacturing of
other finished products.
24. Id. at § 4.1(A)(3Xa).
25. Id. at § 4.1(A)(3)(b).
26. Id. at § 4.1(A)(3Xc).
27. Id. at § 4.1(A)(4).
28. Id. at § 4.1(A)(5).
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also had the ability to increase or decrease the price-index rates with a two-thirds vote
of each house.29
The owner or operator of the facility in which the hydrocarbons were processed
would have had to collect the tax due from the owner of the hydrocarbons and remit
them monthly.3° Owners and operators of hydrocarbon processing facilities who
neglected, failed, or refused to collect or remit the tax due would have been liable for
the full amount of such taxes, interest and penalties that should have been collected and
remitted.3' Purchasers of hydrocarbons upon which the tax had not been paid would
have had to deduct the tax due from the amount due to the owner.32 Purchasers who
failed to deduct or withhold the amount of taxes due also would have been liable for
the full amount of such taxes, interest and penalties that should have been deducted and
withheld.3" The tax liability due would have operated as a first lien andprivilege on the
hydrocarbons of the owner from whom the tax was due.34 The first lien and privilege
of the hydrocarbons would have followed the hydrocarbons into the hands of third
persons regardless of good or bad faith and regardless of whether the hydrocarbons
were in a manufactured or unmanufactured state.35
Once an owner of hydrocarbons had paid the tax, no further tax would have been
due from that owner or any subsequent owner of the processed hydrocarbons.36 This
provision essentially limited the imposition of the processing tax to the first processing
of the hydrocarbons within Louisiana. Owners who had paid a similar tax to another
state for using hydrocarbon processing facilities to process hydrocarbons subsequently
imported into Louisiana would have received a credit against the tax.37 The Louisiana
tax credit only would have been valid ifthe other state, which had imposed the original
processing tax, granted a similar credit.3'
The tax provided exemptions for "wells with minimal production capabilities,"39
which were intended to encourage "national oil and gas production from wells with
minimal production capabilities."' For the exemptions to apply, the owners of the
hydrocarbons that were processed at Louisiana facilities must have obtained the
hydrocarbons from one of four specifically identified categories ofwells including: (1)
any well incapable ofproducing more than twenty-five barrels ofoil per producing day
during an entire month of operation and which produces at least fifty percent salt water
per day," (2) any well determined to be a "stripper well,"' 2 (3) gas produced from a
29. Id.
30. Id. at § 4.1 (DX2Xa).
31. Id. at § 4.1(DX2Xb).
32. Id. at § 4.1(DX2)(a).
33. Id. at § 4.1(DX2)(b).
34. Id. at § 4.1(DX3).
35. Id.
36. Id. at § 4.1(C)(1).
37. Id. at § 4.1(CX2).
38. Id.
39. Id. at § 4.1(AX6).
40. Id.
41. Id. at § 4.1(AX6Xi).
42. Id. at § 4.1 (A)(6Xii). A "stripper well" is an oil well incapable of producing an average of
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well with a "well head pressure" of fifty pounds per square inch gauge or less under
operating conditions, or, gas rising in a vaporous state through the annular space
between the casing and tubing of such oil well and released through lines connected
with the casing head gas which has been determined to have a casing head pressure of
fifty pounds per square inch gauge or less under the operating conditions for an entire
month,43 and (4) any gas well incapable ofproducing an average of250,000 cubic feet
of gas per day during an entire operating month.'
In addition to a repeal of the severance tax levied on oil and gas, Senate Bill
Number I also provided an elaborate procedural mechanism for court challenges to the
tax 5 and a severability clause.'
The hydrocarbon processing tax possessed attributes ofboth an excise tax and an
ad valorem tax. An excise tax typically is imposed upon a specifically identified
transaction and is measured by the consideration paid for the transaction. Ad valorem
taxes are imposed upon the presence of property on a given date and are measured by
the value of the property taxed. The hydrocarbon processing tax combined these
characteristics because it was to be imposed upon the "use ofhydrocarbon processing
facilities" but was to be measured by the volume and value of the hydrocarbon at a
given time. In Hunt- Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Board of California, the U.S.
Supreme Court recited a tax axiom that "a tax on sleeping measured by the number of
pair of shoes in your closet is a tax on shoes."' 7 Under this reasoning, the practical
effect ofthe hydrocarbonprocessing tax resembled a tax onproperty. Of the more than
thirty events that satisfy the definition of "use of a hydrocarbon facility," all required
measurement of the presence of the hydrocarbon itself; the tax rate was the same
regardless of the complexity of the event. Further, the exemptions provided for by
Senate Bill Number 1 had no relationship to the processing facility; rather, all were
based upon the origin of the hydrocarbon. Finally, if the tax went unpaid, a lien
attached to the hydrocarbons and not the processing facility.
B. History of Taxation on Hydrocarbons in Louisiana
1. The First Use Tax
The first effort by the Louisiana Legislature to establish a tax regime capable of
ensnaring hydrocarbons flowing in commerce through the state was the "First Use
Tax." The First Use Tax Act explicitly justified the tax with the state's policy to
more than 10 barrels of oil per producing day during an entire operating month.
43. Id. at § 4.1(A)(6Xiii).
44. Id. at § 4.1(AX6Xiv).
45. Id. at § 4.1(G).
46. Id. at § 2.
47. 528 U.S. 458,464,120 S. Ct. 1022, 1026 (citing Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dept. of Treas., 498
U.S. 358, 374, 111 S. Ct. 818, 829 (1991)).
48. See supra note S. 1978 La. Acts No. 294 § 1, codified at La. R.S. 47:1301 (1990).
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conserve its natural resources 49-including oil and gas, water bottoms, barrier islands
and coastal areas within the state. The First Use Tax Act provided:
It is one of the express purposes of this tax to require the exaction of fair
and reasonable compensation to the citizens of this state for the costs
incurred and paid with public funds, which costs enure solely to the
benefit of the owners of natural gas produced beyond the boundaries of
Louisiana, although introduced into the state, and to provide some
measure of reimbursement to the citizens for damages to the state's water
bottoms, barrier reefs and sensitive shore lands as a direct consequence of
activity within the state associated with such natural gas by the owners
thereof °
The First Use Tax was levied at the rate of seven cents per one thousand cubic
feet ("MCF") of natural gas upon the first use of the natural gas in Louisiana." The
term "use" established the scope of the taxable activity and was broadly deffmed as:
the sale; the transportation in the state to the point of delivery at the inlet
of any processing plant; the transportation in the state of unprocessed
natural gas to the point of delivery at the inlet of any measurement or
storage facility; transfer of possession or relinquishment of control at a
delivery point in the state; processing for the extraction of liquefiable
component products or waste materials; use in manufacturing; treatment;
or other ascertainable action at a point within the state.
52
The First Use Tax and other statutory provisions created a variety of
exclusions, exemptions and credits from the imposition of the tax. 3 For example,
natural gas subject to a severance tax on the volume of production in any state or
territory of the United States was excluded from the First Use Tax. 4 In addition,
any natural gas subject to a levy of any import tax or tariff by the United States as
an import from a foreign country was excluded." An exemption was also allowed
for natural gas used or consumed in the drilling for or production of oil, natural gas,
sulfur, or in the processing of natural gas for liquid extractions in the state.56
Likewise, an exemption was provided for gas shrinkage volumes attributable to the
extraction of ethane, propane, butanes, natural or casing head gasoline or other
49. La. R.S. 47:1301(A)(1990). Specifically delineating a state purpose in a statute is intended
to justify a rational relationshipbetween the tax and the object of the tax. See infra notes 134-35 and
accompanying text. It can also be used to justify a rationale basis for treating ostensibly similar
taxpayers or objects differently. See infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
50. Id. at § 1301(C).
51. Id. at § 1303(B).
52. Id.
53. Id. at§ 1303(A).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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liquefiable hydrocarbons."7 Natural gas that was used or consumed in the
manufacture of fertilizer and anhydrous ammonia within the state was also
exempted from the tax.58 A credit against any other Louisiana tax, except a
severance tax, was provided to municipal and state regulated electric generating
plants located in Louisiana to the extent any First Use Tax was paid by an entity on
natural gas produced in the Federal Outer Continental Shelf ("OCS").O The same
credit was provided to natural gas distribution centers located in Louisiana and
direct purchases of natural gas used for consumption in the state of Louisiana.'
Finally, any taxpayer subject to the First Use Tax was given a dollar-for-dollar
credit against Louisiana severance tax liability.
6
'
The First Use Tax detailed the absorption of the tax burden. The tax was
imposed on the "owner" of the natural gas and was specifically deemed a "cost
associated with uses made by the owner in preparation of marketing of the natural
gas."62 The statute prohibited the owner of the natural gas at the time of its
imposition of the First Use Tax from claiming a right of reimbursement or refund
of such taxes from any other party in interest, other than the purchaser of such
natural gas.63 Any agreement to the contrary, which may have redirected the burden
of the tax to anyone but a consumer, was declared against public policy and
unenforceable to that extent."
Eight states challenged the constitutionality of the First Use Tax in the United
States Supreme Court under five separate provisions of the United States
Constitution.65 In Maryland v. Louisiana," the United States Supreme Court held
that Louisiana's First Use Tax violated the Supremacy Clause6" and the Commerce
Clause.6 It declined to analyze the First Use Tax under the Import/Export Clause,69
the Impairment of Contracts Clause" or the Equal Protection Clause.7
The Supremacy Clause argument focused on whether the First Use Tax
interfered with the federal government's efforts under the Natural Gas Act 72 to
regulate the transportation and sale of natural gas in interstate commerce.73 Under
then existing law, natural gas owners were entitled to recover from their customers
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. La. R.S. 47:11(B) (1979).
60. Id.
61. 1978 La. Acts No. 436 § 1, codified at La. R.S. 47:647 (1979).
62. La. R.S. 47:1303(c) (1978).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 451 U.S. 725, 734, 101 S. Ct. 2114,2122(1981).
66. Id.
67. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3; 451 U.S. at 760, 101 S. Ct. at 2136.
69. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
70. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
71. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717W (1976ed. and Supp. III), as amendedby the Natural Gas Policy Act
of 1978, 15 U.S.C. 3320.
73. 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S. Ct. 2122, 2128 (1981).
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all legitimate costs associated with the production, processing and transportation of
natural gas. 4 Unprocessed gas extracted at the wellhead includes hydrocarbons that
are often owned and sold separately from the "dried" gas." The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") normally allocates part of the processing costs
between these related hydrocarbons and the unprocessed gas, insisting that the
owners of the liquefiable hydrocarbons share in the expense associated with
processing.76 The First Use Tax deemed the tax to be a processing cost on natural
gas borne by either the pipeline or other owner without compensation-an unlikely
event in light of the large sums involved-or passed on to purchasers." In effect,
FERC argued at trial that the First Use Tax absorption rule shifted the incidence of
certain expenses that were incurred substantially for the benefit of the owners of
extractable hydrocarbons to the ultimate consumer of the processed gas without the
prior approval of FERC."s
The Supreme Court recognized that under the Natural Gas Act, determining
pipeline and producer costs was the task of the FERC in the first instance and was
subject to judicial review." The Supreme Court reasoned that even if FERC
ultimately determined that such expense should be passed on, the decision-making
authority rested with FERC. Thus, the First Use Tax statute, because of its
absorption requirement, was inconsistent with the federal scheme ° and was
declared invalid under the Supremacy Clause.8'
The Supreme Court also evaluated the First Use Tax under the Commerce
Clause. The Court noted that the flow of gas from the OCS wells through
processing plants in Louisiana and through the interstate pipelines to ultimate
customers in over thirty states constituted interstate commerce. 2 Recognizing that
a state tax is not per se invalid because it burdens interstate commerce, a state's
right to tax interstate commerce is limited. The Court stated that "no state tax may
be sustained unless the tax (1) has the substantial nexus with the State; (2) is fairly
apportioned; (3) does not discriminate against interstate commerce; and (4) is fairly
related to the services provided by the State." 3
The Supreme Court did not address the nexus, fair apportionment, and fair
relationship prongs but instead based its ruling on the discriminatory nature of the
First Use Tax. The Court noted that a state tax must be assessed in light of its
actual effect and that it must be considered in conjunction with other provisions of
the state's tax scheme." In this case, the Court was satisfied that the First Use Tax
74. Id. at 748, 101 S. Ct. at 2130.
75. Id. at 749, 101 S. Ct. at2130.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 750, 101 S. Ct. at 2131.
79. Id. at 751, 101 S. Ct. at 2131.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 747-48, 101 S. Ct. at 2129.
82. Id. at 754-55, 101 S. Ct. at 2133-34.
83. Id. at 754, 101 S. Ct. at 2133 (citing Washington Revenue Dept. v. Washington Stevedoring
Ass'n, 435 U.S. 734, 750,98 S. Ct. 1388, 1399 (1978)).
84. Id. at 756, 101 S. Ct. at 2134.
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discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local interest because of its
various credits and exclusions.S For example, Outer Continental Shelf("OCS') gas
used for certain purposes within Louisiana was exempt from the tax, but
competitive users in other states were burdened with the tax for identical uses."
The Court also noted that the dollar-for-dollar credit against Louisiana severance
tax for anyone paying the First Use Tax on OCS gas favored those who owned OCS
gas and engaged in Louisiana production. 7 The economic effect of the credit
encouraged natural gas owners involved in the production of OCS gas to invest in
mineral exploration and development within Louisiana rather than invest in further
OCS development or production in other states. 8 Finally, the Court noted that the
credits provided to electric generating facilities, natural gas distribution companies
and Louisiana consumers of OCS gas against other state taxes substantially
protected Louisiana consumers against the impact of the First Use Tax while
consumers of OCS gas moving out-of-state were burdened with the tax. 9 The
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the discriminatory activity couldbejustified
as a proper compensating tax intended to complement the state's severance tax"
because any compensatory tax first requires identification of the burden for which
the state attempts to compensate. 91 Recognizing that Louisiana had an interest in
protecting its natural resources and that it had imposed a severance tax on local
production of natural gas as the vehicle to protect that interest, the Court noted that
the First Use Tax did not achieve that end because Louisiana had "no sovereign
interest in being compensated for the severance of resources from the federal owned
OCS land."92 The Court explained that the common thread running through the
cases that concerned whole and compensatory taxes was the equality of treatment
between local and interstate commerce.93 However, the Court also noted that the
paradigm of credits and exemptions allowed by the Louisiana statutes undeniably
violated the principle of equality.' Thus, the Court held the First Use Tax to be
unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause."
2. Coastal Wetlands Environmental Levy
In the wake of Maryland v. Louisiana, Louisiana Governor David C. Treen
assembled a team of tax advisors and requested that they draft a state tax statute
responsive to the environmental problems plaguing Louisiana's coastal wetlands."
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 757, 101 S. Ct. at 2134.
89. Id. at 757-58, 101 S. Ct. at 2134-35.
90. id. at 758, 101 S. Ct. at 2135.
91. Id. at 759, 101 S. Ct. at 2135.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., The ConstitutionalityofState Environmental Taxes, 58 Tu. L. Rev. 169
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In the 1982 Regular Session, the Louisiana Legislature proposed House Bill 1660,
known as the Coastal Wetlands Environmental Levy ("CWEL")' that was designed
to address the constitutional infirmities identified in Maryland v. Louisiana."
As with the First Use Tax, CWEL explicitly described the stated purpose of the
tax. It provided:
The purpose of this Act is to provide revenues... necessary capital
improvements and public services and to ameliorate and mitigate the
impact of the environmental harm to the Louisiana coastal area caused by
activities associated with the transportation and development of oil and
natural gas. This purpose is consistent with and supportive of the concern
expressed by the federal government in the Coastal Zone Management
Act.
The State of Louisiana finds that the creation and continued use of
facilities associated with the transportation of oil and natural gas through
Louisiana coastal wetlands caused environmental harm to the state and
burdened the state with the necessity of providing capital outlays related
to the improvements of the infrastructure of the state and restoration of the
wetlands."
Unlike the First Use Tax, CWEL taxed oil as well as natural gas flowing in
interstate commerce through the state of Louisiana."° The CWEL tax was levied
at a rate of six cents per MCF of natural gas and thirty-six cents per barrel of oil for
the use of facilities to transport the products through the Louisiana wetlands."'0 The
term "use of facilities" was defined as the "use for more than one mile of facilities
for oil and natural gas transportation through Louisiana coastal wetlands."'0 °
In order to avoid a Supremacy Clause challenge that might result from
interference with the Natural Gas Act, CWEL did not specify which party would
ultimately bear the burden of the tax;0 3 and it attempted to avoid conflicting with
the Coastal Zone Management Act by specifically stating that its purpose was to be
congruent with federal efforts."°W Nevertheless, CWEL faced the same obstacles
as the First Use Tax did with respect to interference with the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA").0 5 Its proponents pointed out that CWEL was not
designed to allow Louisiana to capture rent that would otherwise be earned by the
federal government in its capacity as owner of oil and gas reserves in the OCS."'
(1983).
97. Id. at 173-74.
98. Edwards, supra note 11, at 219-22.
99. Id. at 220-21 (citing H.R. 1660, 8th Leg. Sess. § I (La. 1982)).
100. Id. at 221.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 220.
104. See supra note 99.
105. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1866(2000) [hereinafter OCSLA]see also, Edwards, supra note 11, at
273.
106. Pierce, supra note 96, at 210.
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On the contrary, it was designed to offset the external social costs imposed on the
state of Louisiana by such activities as oil and gas exploration and production on
the OCS. °7 In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court declined to rule on
whether or not the tax on the identified use of facilities in Louisiana was equivalent
to a tax on the product itself ' Opponents of CWEL argued that, to the extent the
incidence of tax could be considered to be on the product, CWEL was in direct
conflict with the OCSLA.' 9
CWEL avoided "the complex system of exemptions and credits designed to
immunize in-state concerns from the effects"" e of the tax which had led the U.S.
Supreme Court to hold the First Use Tax unconstitutional as discriminating against
interstate commerce. Opponents, however, argued that CWEL implicated the nexus
and fair apportionment issues that the Supreme Court had not addressed in
Maryland v. Louisiana when it reviewed the First Use Tax since that decision was
based on a "discrimination holding."'
C. Hydrocarbon Processing Tax Compared to First Use Tax and CWEL
The hydrocarbon processing tax did not articulate a state policy or specific
purpose. It continued the trend to expand the reach of the tax to a broader range of
hydrocarbon products by adding "refined products" to the list of hydrocarbons
subject to tax. The hydrocarbon processing tax modeled the First Use Tax
approach by virtue of the fact that the incidence of taxation was based on numerous
identified triggering events. As for measurement of the tax, the hydrocarbon
processing tax adopted a "volume and value" approach, similar to that of both the
First Use Tax and CWEL. Akin to the First Use Tax and CWEL, the tax burden in
the hydrocarbon processing tax fell on the owner of the product at the moment the
taxable incident was triggered. Rather than employing exclusions, exemptions, and
credits to integrate and equalize the tax burden between the Louisiana severance tax
regime and the new hydrocarbon processing tax levy, Senate Bill Number 1
eliminated the severance tax on oil and gas in Louisiana altogether."' The only
107. Id.
108. 451 U.S. 725,752n.26, 101 S. Ct. 2114,2132n.26(1981).
109. Edwards, supra note 11, at 273-78.
110. Id. at 220.
111. Id. at 236-37.
112. The call to repeal the severance tax on oil and gas extraction also addresses a Louisiana
Constitutional barrier to imposition ofa hydrocarbonprocessing tax posed by Bel Oil Corp. v. Fontenot,
238 La. 1002,117 So. 2d 571 (1959). In Bel Oil Corp., the Louisiana Supreme Court determined that
a tax on "gas gathering" was contrary to Article VII, Section 4(B) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921
which specifically limited taxes on natural resources to a severance tax, to wit, "[i]o further or additional
tax or license shall be levied or imposed upon oil, gas or sulphur leases or right." Id. at 1009, 117 So.
2d at 573. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that "the levy under attack is another tax upon gas leases
or rights, and as such comes squarely under the quoted prohibition. In fact, although denominated a'gas
gathering' tax, the levy covers a process which forms an integral part of severing the natural resource
or reducing it to possession, and as such must be struck down...." Id. Without its repeal provision,
a similar argument could have been made that a hydrocarbon processing tax would be contrary to
Louisiana Constitution of 1974, art. VII, § 4(13).
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exemptions permitted by the hydrocarbon processing tax were for oil and gas
produced from low yield wells, ' similar to the relief granted under the Louisiana
severance tax regime. "4 The only credit permitted under Senate Bill Number 1, a
feature in both the First Use Tax and CWEL, was for those taxpayers who had paid
a similar tax in another state before importing the product into Louisiana, provided
that the other state grants a similar credit to products originally processed in
Louisiana. ' The hydrocarbon processing tax did not direct which party ultimately
would bear the burden of absorbing the tax. Finally, like the First Use Tax, the
hydrocarbon tax provided an elaborate procedural mechanism to expedite
anticipated litigation" 6 and sever any part declared unconstitutional."'
III. CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Applicable Constitutional Doctrines
Over twenty years have passed since the United States Supreme Court analyzed
the First Use Tax in Maryland v. Louisiana. At the time the Court analyzed the
First Use Tax, it was applying two recently issued landmark cases involving state
taxing power-Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady"' and Michelin Tire Corp. v.
Wages."9 During the intervening period, the Supreme Court has confronted
numerous challenges to the imposition of state taxes based on the same
constitutional provisions, prompting further development of the jurisprudence in the
area.
1. Due Process Clause
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution limits state power
to impose taxes. It provides, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty
or property without due process of law."'20 In order to satisfy the Due Process
Clause, a state tax must meet a minimum connection and rational relationship,
requirement. '' To satisfy the minimum connection requirement, there must be a
sufficient nexus, "some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax."' 2 Based on the principle
of"fundamental fairness of governmental activity," the Due Process Clause nexus
113. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
114. La. R.S. 47:633 (2000).
115. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
116. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
118. 430 U.S. 274, 97S. Ct. 1076(1977).
119. 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
120. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 3.
121. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,306, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
122. Id. (citing Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,347 U.S. 340,344-45,74 S. Ct. 535,538-39(1954)).
123. 504 U.S. at 312, 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
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analysis questions whether an individual's connections with a state are substantial
enough to legitimate the state's exercise of power over the person."
Because of the wide variety of state tax measures, the Supreme Court has
articulated various forms ofthe nexus analysis. In general, the analyses have evolved
into two levels of inquiry-presence nexus and transactional nexus. Presence nexus
analysis focuses on the individual bearing the tax burden and questions whether the
state even has authority to tax the taxpayer.'" The "presence" necessary to satisfy due
process for tax purposes is equivalent to the presence necessary for a state court to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the person in a civil state court matter." If a
taxpayer purposely avails itself of the benefits of an economic market in the taxing
state, even if it has no physical presence in the state, such contact is sufficient to satisfy
the presence requirement.1" The courts have also determined what type of activity
constitutes "purposeful availment." InAsahi Metal lndustry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court
of California, Solano County, the Supreme Court refused to recognize the exercise
ofpersonal jurisdiction over a nonresident corporation based onthe defendant's act of
placing a product in the stream ofconmerce.'" The Court noted that the Due Process
Clause requires the defendant's action to be more purposely directed at the forum state
than the mere placing of a product in the stream of commerce."3
Once the presence nexus requirement is satisfied, the transactional nexus analysis
becomes relevant. Transactional nexus analysis considers the reach of a state's tax
measure.' The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[a]lthough our modem
due process jurisprudence rejects a rigid, formalistic definition of minimum
connection, we have not abandoned the requirement that, in the case of a tax on an
activity, there must be a connection to the activity itself, rather than a connection only
to the actor the state seeks to tax."' Thus, a state's power to tax activities of a
taxpayer is justified by the "protection, opportunities and benefits" that a state confers
on those activities.'
Finally, the rational relationship requirement of the Due Process Clause measures
the relationship between the tax imposed by the state and the benefits that the taxpayer
received from its activity in connection with the taxing state. I It requires that "income
attributed to the State for tax purposes must be rationally related to 'values connected
with the taxing State'."'35 In this sense, fundamental fairness is safeguarded.
124. Id.
125. Allied-Signal,Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,778,112 S. Ct. 2251,2258(1992),
126. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 307-08, 112 S. Ct. at 1910-11.
127. Id.
128. 480 U.S. 102, 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 112,107 S. Ct. at 1032.
131. Allied-Signal,Inc.,v. Dir., Div of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768,778,112 S. Ct. 2251,2258 (1992).
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435,444,61 S. Ct. 246,250 (1940)).
134. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1909 (1992).
135. Id. at 306,112 S. Ct. at 1909-10(citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,273, 98 S.
Ct. 2340, 2344-45 (1978)).
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2. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution provides, "[t]he
Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce among the several
States."'136 In addition to vesting Congress with the authority to regulate interstate
commerce,3'" the Commerce Clause has been interpreted as prohibiting states from
enacting laws that discriminate against or interfere with interstate commerce. 3 '
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[t]hough phrased as a grant of
regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been understood to have a
'negative' aspect that denies the States the power unjustifiably to discriminate
against or burden the interstate flow of articles of commerce."""
a. What constitutes interstate commerce for purposes of Commerce
Clause analysis?
In reconsidering the ambit of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court in
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana' ° departed from the once adhered to
distinction between intrastate or "local" activities and interstate activities in the
context of a state's taxing power. 4' According to this distinction, state taxes were
immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny if the tax was imposed on intrastate
activities only. 2 Any direct tax on interstate activity was per se invalid.43 In
Commonwealth Edison, the Court held that taxes imposed on intrastate or local
activities, even prior to the entry of goods into interstate commerce, may
nevertheless substantially affect interstate commerce and therefore must be
examined under the negative doctrine implicit in the Commerce Clause.'"
Accordingly, a state tax imposed on even a "local" activity will be subject to
Commerce Clause scrutiny if it affects interstate commerce.e'4 Consistent with this
view, the Supreme Court subjected a severance tax on coal produced in Montana
to Commerce Clause scrutiny. " Even though the severance tax was levied on what
might be considered the "local" activity of producing the coal prior to its entry into
interstate commerce, the severance tax was nonetheless held to affect interstate
commerce.
47
136. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
137. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824).
138. Id.; Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298,309,112 S. Ct. 1904,1911-12 (1992) (citing
South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938)).
139. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of the State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 98,
114 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (1994).
140. 453 U.S. 609, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
141. Id. at 614-17,101 S. Ct. at2951-53.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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In Maryland v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court noted that "the flow of gas from
the OCS wells, through processing plants in Louisiana, and through interstate
pipelines to the ultimate consumers in over 30 States constitutes interstate
commerce."' 48 The Court was satisfied that the local events identified as "uses"
in the First Use Tax did not interrupt the continual flow of gas in interstate
commerce. 1
49
b. Analysis under the Commerce Clause
The United States Supreme Court has often applied, and somewhat refined,
what has come to be known as "Complete Auto's four-part test" to evaluate state
taxes under the Commerce Clause. s In Quill Corp. v. South Dakota,' the
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e will sustain a tax against a Commerce Clause challenge so long as
the "tax [1] is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, [2] is fairly apportioned, [3] does not discriminate against
interstate commerce, and [4] is fairly related to the services provided by
the State."'
' 2
The substantial nexus requirement of the Complete Auto Transit test
underwent a thorough examination in Quill. The Court pointed out that "[d]espite
the similarity in phrasing, the nexus requirements of the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses are not identical. The two standards are animated by different
constitutional concerns and policies."'5 Based on the principle of "fundamental
fairness of governmental activity," Due Process nexus analysis questions whether
an individual's connections with a state are substantial enough to legitimate the
state's exercise of power over the person.'54 The Commerce Clause substantial
nexus analysis is driven by the "structural concerns of the effects of state
regulation on the national economy."' 55 The Supreme Court explained that the
first and fourth prongs of Complete Auto's four-part test:
limit the reach of state taxing authority to ensure that the state's taxation
does not unduly burden interstate commerce .... Thus, the "substantial
nexus" requirement is not, like due process's "minimum contacts"
requirement, a proxy for notice, but rather a means for limiting state
burdens on interstate commerce. . . . Undue burdens on interstate
commerce may be avoided not only by a case-by-case evaluation of the
148. 451 U.S. 725, 754, 101 S. Ct. 2114,2133 (1981).
149. Id.
150. Oklahoma TaxComm'n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.,514 U.S. 175, 183, 115S. Ct. 1331, 1337
(1995).
151. 504U.S. 298, 112 S. Ct. 1904 (1992).
152. Id. at 311, 112 S. Ct. at 1912.
153. Id. at 312, 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
154. Id.; see supra notes 123-133 and accompanying text.
155. 504 U.S. at 312, 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
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actual burdens imposed by particular regulations or taxes, but also, in
some situations, by the demarcation of a discrete realm of commercial
activity that is free from interstate taxation.'
' 56
In the end, the Supreme Court's focus on the substantial nexus requirement is
a flexible balancing inquiry used on a case by case basis to ferret out any state tax
that placed an undo burden on interstate commerce.
The second prong of Complete Auto Transit's test requires that the state tax be
fairly apportioned. "[The central purpose behind the apportionment requirement
is to ensure that each State taxes only its fair share of an interstate transaction.' 5 7
The Supreme Court has stated that the fair apportionment requirement will be
satisfied only if a tax is "internally" and "externally" consistent.5 A tax is
internally consistent if it is structured so that if every jurisdiction applied the tax,
"it would result in no more than all of the unitary business' income being taxed."'1
5 9
The Court has also explained that, "[i]nternal consistency is preserved when the
imposition of a tax identical to the one in question by every other State would add
no burden to interstate commerce that intrastate commerce would not also bear. ' ' "e
For example, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., an Oklahoma
sales tax on bus tickets sold in Oklahoma for interstate travel was held to be
internally consistent because a ticket could only be sold in one location.' 6' Even if
every state adopted a similar sales tax, the sale would not be subject to multiple
taxation because the event, the sale, could only occur in one location; therefore it
could only be taxed once. 62 Thus, the Oklahoma sales tax on the gross receipts
from the sale was internally consistent without dividing the tax base by applying a
percentage fonnula. 6'
A state tax is externally consistent if the tax does not "reach beyond that
portion of value that is fairly attributable to economic activity within the taxing
State."'" External consistency requires that the state tax only that portion of the
revenues from interstate activity that "reasonably reflects the in-state component
of the activity being taxed." 65 "[T]he external consistency test is essentially a
156. Id. at 312-14,112 S. Ct. at 1913-15. In regard to use taxes, the Supreme Court held that for
Commerce Clause substantial nexus purposes,a corporation must be physically present in a state for that
state to impose collection responsibility upon the corporation. As a result, an out-of-state mail-order
house with no physical presence in a state need not collect and pay a use tax on goods sold to customers
for use in the state. Id. at 312, 112 S. Ct. at 1913.
i57. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 260, 109 S. Ct. 582, 588 (1989).
158. ContainerCorp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169, 103 S. Ct. 2933, 2942
(1983).
159. Id.
160. OklahomaTax Commissionv. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175,185,115 S. Ct. 1331,1338
(1995).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 262, 109 S. Ct. 582, 589 (1989).
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practical inquiry."'" In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois
telecommunications excise tax on all interstate long distance telephone calls
originating or terminating in Illinois and charged to an Illinois service address was
externally consistent. 67 In so holding, the Supreme Court noted the difficulty in
administering an intangible movement and held the taxing scheme to be
reasonable.'" Similarly, in Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, an
Oklahoma sales tax was deemed externally consistent because it "reach[ed] only
the activity taking place within the taxing State, that is, the sale of the service. '" 9
The third requirement under the Complete Auto Transit test requires that a tax
not discriminate against interstate commerce. A state tax that discriminates
against interstate commerce will be unconstitutional unless the Supreme Court,
applying its strictest scrutiny, determines that it "advances a legitimate local
purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives.""7 " Even so, state laws containing discriminatory clauses against
interstate commerce have been held "virtually per se invalid.'' In Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison,72 a Maine statute instituted a
property tax that exempted charitable and benevolent institutions. 73 However, the
exemption excluded charitable and benevolent institutions whose "operations
principally benefitted nonresidents of Maine."'' The Supreme Court described
the statute as facially discriminatory against interstate commerce," and thus it
violated the Commerce Clause.7 6 Likewise, in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v.
Department of Environmental Quality of Oregon,'" Oregon imposed a surcharge
on the state disposal of waste generated from another state that was higher than the
fee imposed on the disposal of waste generated within Oregon.7" The Supreme
Court held the surcharge to be facially discriminatory and invalid under the
Commerce Clause. 79
State laws that have the practical effect of discriminating against interstate
commerce are also invalid under the Commerce Clause.' 0 In West Lynn Creamery,
166. Id. at 264, 109 S. Ct. at 590.
167. Id. at 265, 109 S. Ct. at 591.
168. Id. at 264, 109 S. Ct. at 590.
169. 514 U.S. 175, 196, 115S. Ct. 1331, 1334 (1995).
170. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of EnvtIl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 101, 114
S. Ct. 1345,1351 (1994) (citing New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,278, 108 S. Ct.
1803, 1810 (1988); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 1737 (1979)).
171. Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325,331,116 S. Ct. 848,854 (1996)(citing Oregon Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Departnentof Envtl. Quality of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 99, 114 S. Ct. 1345, 1350 (1994)).
172. 520 U.S. 564, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
173. Id. at 568, 117 S. Ct. at 1594.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 575, 117 S. Ct. at 1598.
176. Id.
177. 511 U.S. 93, 114 S. Ct. 1345 (1994).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454,455,61 S. Ct. 334,335 (1940).
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Inc. v. Healy, ' Massachusetts required milk dealers to make a premium payment for
milk sold in the state.' 82 The tax was assessed on all milk regardless of whether or not
it was produced in Massachusetts, 3 but all payments received by Massachusetts were
distributed to dairy farmers located in Massachusetts as a subsidy for their dairy
operations. 4 The Supreme Court struck down the statute because it discriminated
against interstate commerce in favor of local interests in violation of the Commerce
Clause. ' The practical effect of the tax was to burden exclusively out of state dairy
farmers-a result achieved by the subsidy paid to in-state dairy farmers.8 6 Bearing
a strong similarity to the Massachusetts tax declared unconstitutional in West Lynn
Creamery, the First Use Tax discriminated against interstate commerce because of its
various exemptions and credits. Therefore, it too was also held to be unconstitutional.
In General Motors Corp. v. Tracy'8' the Supreme Court introduced a "threshold
question" into the analysis of whether a tax unconstitutionally discriminates against
interstate commerce. The Court held that any notion of discrimination under the
Commerce Clause assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities.
8 8
Specifically, the Court explained:
Conceptually,... any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of
substantially similar entities .... [Wihen the allegedly competing entities
provide different products... there is a threshold question whether the
companies are indeed similarly situated for constitutional purposes. This is
so for the simple reason that the difference in products may mean that the
different entities serve different markets, and would continue to do so even
if the supposedly discriminatory burden were removed. If in fact that should
be the case, eliminating the tax or other regulatory differential would not
serve the dormant Commerce Clause's fundamental objective of preserving
a national market for competition undisturbed by preferential advantages
conferred by a State upon its residents or resident competitors.... [I]n the
absence of actual or prospective competition between the supposedly
favored and disfavored entities in a single market there can be no local
preference, whether by express discrimination against interstate commerce
or undue burden upon it, to which the dormant Commerce Clause may
apply. The dormant Commerce Clause protects markets and participants in
markets, not taxpayers as such. 9
181. 512 U.S. 186,114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994).
182. Id. at 190, 114 S. Ct. at 2210.
183. Id. at 188, 114 S. Ct. at 2209.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 519 U.S. 278, 117 S. Ct. 811 (1997).
188. Id. at 298, 117 S. Ct. at 824.
189. Id. (quoting H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539, 69 S. Ct. 657, 665
(1949)). See also Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 469, 112 S. Ct. 789, 808 (1992) (Scalia, J
dissenting) ("Our negative Commerce Clause jurisprudence grew out of the notion that the Constitution
implicitly established a national free market...."); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429,437, 100 S. Ct.
2271, 2277 (1980) (The dormant Commerce Clause prevents "state taxes and regulatory measures
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At issue in General Motors Corp. was an Ohio sales and use tax on the sale of
natural gas by independent natural gas distributors; local public utilities however
were exempt from the tax."9 The natural gas provided by public utilities was
"bundled" with services and protections required by regulation,' 9' while the natural
gas provided by independent distributors was not."9 Because the natural gas was
bundled with services and protections, the Supreme Court believed that the
products, as well as the market to which the products were sold, were distinct. 93
Consequently, the independent distributors were found not to be similarly situated
and not in competition with the public utilities."94 Because the Commerce Clause
was designed to protect markets and the participants within them, the Commerce
Clause would not apply if the discrimination did not affect economic choices..95
Thus, the Ohio tax did not discriminate against interstate commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause."9
Even if a tax does discriminate against interstate commerce, the tax will
nevertheless survive Commerce Clause scrutiny upon a showing that it is
compensatory. 97 The "compensatory tax doctrine" was developed to "make
interstate commerce bear a burden already born by intrastate commerce."' 98 To
take advantage of the compensatory tax doctrine, a state must first identify the
intrastate burden for which the state is attempting to compensate. 99 Next, the tax
on interstate commerce must be roughly approximate to, but not exceed, the amount
of tax on intrastate commerce.2' Finally, the events on which interstate and
intrastate taxes are imposed must be "substantially equivalent."2 '
The fourth and final requirement for a state tax to be valid under the Commerce
Clause is that the tax be fairly related to the services provided by the state. In
determining whether a tax is "fairly related to the services provided by the state,"
the relevant inquiry does not focus on "the amount of the tax or the value of the
benefits allegedly bestowed as measured by the cost the State incurs on account of
the taxpayer's activities." 2 Rather, the test is whether the measure of the tax is
"reasonably related to the extent of the contact, since it is the activities or presence
impeding free private trade in the national marketplace"); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2445 (1977) (referring to "the Commerce Clause's
overriding requirement of a national 'common market').
190. Id. at282, 117 S. Ct. at 816.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 297, 117 S. Ct. at 823.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 310, 117 S. Ct. at 829.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 312, 117 S. Ct. at 830.
197. Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641,647, 114 S. Ct. 1815,1821 (1994).
198. Id.
199. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., v. Department of Envtl. Quality of State of Or., 511 U.S. 93, 103,
114 S. Ct. 1345, 1352 (1994).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 453 U.S. 609, 625, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 2958 (1981).
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of the taxpayer in the State that may properly be made to bear a 'just share of state
tax burden."'2"3 In Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana,2 the Supreme Court
held that a Montana severance tax on the severance of coal was fairly related to the
services provided by the state even though the burden of the tax was born heavily
by out of state consumers.2"' In that case, the tax was measured by the value of the
coal severed.' °6 The Court concluded that there was a fair relation because the
operating incidence of the tax was on the mining of coal in Montana.2 Because
the tax was based on a percentage of the coal taken, it was in "proper proportion"
to the activities within the state.208
3. Supremacy Clause
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the
Constitution, Laws of The United States and Treaties "shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." ' ° Thus, if a
state tax is contrary to or conflicts in an impermissible manner with federal
legislation, it will be held invalid. While Congress can preempt state law in an area
by enacting legislation that specifically preempts state law,2"' in the absence of
explicit congressional language, state law may nonetheless be preempted when it
is believed that Congress intended to do so. 21 1 Such Congressional intent to
preempt state law can be discerned from a "scheme of federal regulation... so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
States to supplement it," because an "Act of Congress may touch a field in which
the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject. 2 12 To determine whether
federal law impliedly preempts a state tax, the courts will focus on Congress'
intent.1 3
If Congress has not completely "occupied the field" through pervasive
regulation, a state tax will be preempted "to the extent it actually conflicts with
203. Id. at 626, 101 S. Ct. at 2958.
204. 453 U.S. 609, 101 S. Ct. 2946 (1981).
205. Id. at 626, 101 S. Ct. at 2958.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
210. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 97 S. Ct. 1305 (1977).
211. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservationand Dev. Comm'n,461 U.S. 190,
203-04, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1722 (1983).
212. Id. at 204, 103 S.Ct. at 1722 (citing Fidelity Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De Ia Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 153,102 S. Ct. 3014,3022 (1982); quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230,67
S. Ct. 1146,1152 (1947)).
213. California Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Guerra., 479 U.S. 272, 280, 107 S. Ct. 623, 689
(1987).
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federal law."2 4 "Such a conflict arises when 'compliance with both federal and
state regulations is a physical impossibility.'". 5 The conflict may also arise "where
state law 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. "216
The OCSLA explicitly provides that "state taxation laws shall not apply to the
outer Continental Shelf.''2 7 Nevertheless, in Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of
Revenue, the Supreme Court upheld an Iowa tax law that included revenues derived
from the sale of oil and gas produced on the OCS in the apportionable tax base for
purposes of calculating state taxable net income .2 1 The Court explained:
In sum, the language, background, and history of OCSLA leave no doubt
that Congress was exclusively concerned with preventing the adjacent
States from asserting, on the basis of territorial claims, jurisdiction to
assess direct taxes on the OCS. We believe that Congress primarily
intended to prohibit those direct taxes commonly imposed by States
adjacent to offshore production sites: for example, severance and
production taxes.2t9
Consequently, the Court held "that the OCSLA prevent[ed] any State, adjacent or
inland, from asserting extra territorial taxing jurisdiction over OCS lands but that
the inclusion of income derived from the OCS in the unitary tax base ... does not
amount to extraterritorial taxation by the taxing state.""2
In Maryland v. Louisiana, the taxpayers argued that Louisiana's First Use Tax
was a tax on the production of natural gas in the OCS and, therefore, preempted by
43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A)."' While the Court declined to rule on that issue, it
stated "[i]t is clear that a State has no valid interest in imposing a severance tax on
federal OCS land."'
4. Import-Export Clause
The Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution mandates:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary
for executing its inspection Laws; and the net Produce of all Duties and
Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of
214. Pactfic Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04,103 S. Ct. at 1722.
215. Id. at 204, 103 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142-43, 83 S. Ct. 1210, 1217-18 (1963)).
216. Id. at 204, 103 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S. Ct. 399,
404 (1941)).
217. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1333(aX2XA) (2000).
218. 488 U.S. 19, 109 S. Ct. 278 (1988).
219. Id. at 30, 109S. Ct. at 284.
220. Id. at 32, 109 S. Ct. at 285.
221. 451 U.S. 725, 752 n.26, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2132 n.26 (1981).
222. 451 U.S. at 753 n.26, 101 S. Ct. at 2132 n.26.
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the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and Control of Congress.223
The contemporary analysis under the Import-Export Clause was described by the
United States Supreme Court in United States v. International Business Machines
Corp.2 At issue in that case was whether a federal excise tax on insurance
premiums paid to foreign insurers to cover shipments from a U.S. company to its
foreign subsidiaries was a tax on the exports and therefore violated the Export
Clause.225 The government argued that controlling precedent under the Export
Clause"' was no longer valid in light of recent Supreme Court decisions
interpreting the Import-Export Clause, specifically Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages22
and Department of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos.228
In Michelin, the Court considered whether a state could impose a
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on imported tires that were no longer in transit.229
The Supreme Court specifically overruled Low v. Austin23 and discredited the
"original package doctrine" that had prohibited states from imposing a tax until
certain goods had lost their character as "imports" and become part of the mass of
property in the state.23' The Court further analyzed the words "Impost or Duties"
and "decline[d] to presume it was intended to embrace taxation that does not create
the evils that the Clause was specifically intended to eliminate." 2 Noting that the
framers of the Constitution sought to address three main concerns by committing
exclusive power to lay imposted duties on imports with the federal government, the
Court explained:
[T]he federal government must speak with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments, and tariffs, which might
affect foreign relations, could not be implemented by the States
consistently with that exclusive power; import revenues were to be the
major source of revenue of the Federal Government and should not be
diverted to the States; and harmony among the States might be disturbed
unless seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited
from levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports to the other States not situated as favorably
geographically. 3
223. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
224. 517 U.S. 843, 116 S. Ct. 1793 (1996).
225. Id. at 846, 116 S. Ct. at 1796.
226. Id. See also U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 5.
227. 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
228. 435 U.S. 734, 98 S. Ct. 1388 (1978).
229. 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
230. 13 Wall 29 (1872).
231. 423 U.S. 276, 96 S. Ct. 535 (1976).
232. 423 U.S. at 293-94, 96 S. Ct. at 544.
233. Id. at 285-86, 96 S. Ct. at 541.
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With respect to the concern for harmony among the states, the Supreme Court
stated, "[a]n evil to be prevented by the Import-Export Clause was the levying of
taxes which could only be imposed because of the peculiar geographical situation
of certain States that enabled them to single out goods destined for other States." 3 '
Noting that the tires in question in Michelin were no longer in transit at the time of
the imposition of the tax, the Court held that a nondiscriminatory state property tax
does not transgress the policy dictates of the Import-Export Clause. 235 Further, the
Court recognized that the Import-Export Clause was "not written in terms of broad
prohibition ofevery 'tax,' and that imports and duty are narrower terms than tax."236
In Washington Stevedoring Cos.,237 the Supreme Court considered whether a
nondiscriminatory state tax on the gross receipts of a company in the business of
loading and unloading vessels violated the Import-Export Clause.238 The activity
being taxed occurred while the imports and exports were in transit. The
Stevedoring tax on the business of transporting cargo did not directly tax the value
of the cargo as it did in Michelin. The Supreme Court drew upon this distinction
and concluded that the Stevedoring tax was not a prohibited impost or duty.
Relying on Canton R. Co. v. Rogan, 9 which upheld a gross receipts tax on a
railroad operating a dockside marine terminal transporting imports and exports, the
Supreme Court held that taxation of transportation services did not relate to the
value of the goods and could not be considered imposts or duties on the goods.
In International Business Machines Corp., the government argued that,
Michelin and Washington Stevedoring "by analogy permit Congress to impose
generally applicable, nondiscriminatory taxes that fall directly on exports in
transit." 2' In response, the Supreme Court noted:
The Court has never upheld a state tax assessed directly on goods in
import or export transit. In Michelin, we suggested that the Import-Export
Clause would invalidate application of a nondiscriminatory property tax
to goods still in import or export transit. We also declined to endorse the
Government's theory in Washington Stevedoring. After reciting that the
Court in Canton R. Co. had distinguished Thames & Mersey, Fairbank,
and Richfield Oil, we pointed out that in those cases "the State [or Federal
Government] had taxed either the goods or activity so connected with the
goods that the levy amounted to a tax on the goods themselves." We
expressly declined to "reach the question of the applicability of the
Michelin approach when a State directly taxes imports or exports in
transit," because, although the goods in that case were in transit, the tax
fell on "a service distinct from the goods and their value." Thus, contrary
234. Id. at 290, 96 S. Ct. at 543.
235. Id. at 302, 96 S. Ct. at 548.
236. Id.
237. 435 U.S. 734, 98 S. Ct. 1388 (1978).
238. Id.
239. 340U.S. 511,71 S. Ct. 477 (1951).
240. 517 U.S. 843,861, 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1803 (1996).
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to the Government's contention, this Court's Import-Export Clause cases
have not upheld the validity of generally applicable, nondiscriminatory
taxes that fall on imports or exports in transit. We think those cases leave
us free to follow the express textual command of the Export Clause to
prohibit the application of any tax "laid on Articles exported from any
State." 2
4
'
Despite the Court's tendency to abandon formalism in favor of a "principles based"
inquiry, it was unwilling to set aside the "in-transit" doctrine and reserved judgment
on that issue for another day.
B. Grounds for Constitutional Challenges to a Hydrocarbon Processing Tax
The hydrocarbon processing tax possessed the attributes of those state tax
measures that have consistently invited federal constitutional scrutiny. The tax
involved oil and natural gas in transit to the market--commodities vital to the
national economic interest. Although both commodities are produced in Louisiana,
for the most part, they are imported into the state and later exported after bearing
the state tax."4 The incidence of tax was defined as local events that necessarily
take place in a geographical location close to the point of production or importation
of the commodities. The tax was designed to fall on the owner of the commodity,
who may not be a resident of the taxing state. A higher rate of tax was to be
imposed on certain commodities that were imported into the state, as opposed to
those originating in the state. Finally, the tax did not include an apportionment
mechanism-save a credit for similar taxes paid to another state granting
reciprocity. All of the above characteristics provided legitimate grounds to
challenge the constitutionality of the hydrocarbon processing tax.
The two principle Due Process Clause issues presented by the hydrocarbon
processing tax were: (1) the taxation of nonresident owners of the commodities and
(2) the relationship between the tax extracted and the value of the benefit received
from the state. Through the use of tax planning, virtually all of the oil and natural
gas imported into Louisiana can be owned by nonresidents with no contact with the
state other than their ownership of the commodity in transit through the state. The
United States Supreme Court has held that the placement of a product in the stream
of commerce by a nonresident is insufficient to grant in personam jurisdiction over
the nonresident in a state court civil matter."4 The Court has also held that the flow
of natural gas from OCS wells, through processing plants in Louisiana and through
interstate pipelines to ultimate consumers in over thirty states constitutes interstate
241. Id. at 862,116 S. Ct. at 1804(quotingDepartmentofRevenueof Washington v. Association
of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 756n.21,98 S. Ct. 1388,1402 n.21 (1978)).
242. During the presentation to the Louisiana State Law Institute Tax Study Committee, a report
prepared by the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources was circulated and estimated that in the
calendar year 1998, ninety-one percent of crude oil and seventy-seven percent of natural gas processed
in Louisiana were imported into Louisiana.
243. See supra notes 128-130 and accompanying text.
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commerce.2 " Would the Court find sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy the Due
Process "tax nexus" when a nonresident merely places oil and natural gas into the
stream of commerce when it has held that the necessary presence in a state for tax
purposes is equivalent to the presence necessary for in personam jurisdiction
purposes? Does a nonresident owner of the hydrocarbons have sufficient contact
with the state to be subjected to the tax in conformity with due process when all he
has done is place the commodity into the stream of commerce? The rational
relationship requirement for Due Process Clause purposes seems closely aligned
with the "fairly related to services" requirement of the Commerce Clause.
However, contemporary jurisprudence addressing the Due Process analysis is not
unequivocal. The abiding principle that will guide a court in this regard is the
fundamental fairness of the state tax. 4 Perhaps there is a plausible argument that
the magnitude of the tax extraction is confiscatory in nature and out of proportion
to any benefit conferred by the state to the owner of a hydrocarbon being processed
in Louisiana.
The hydrocarbon processing tax also framed a multitude of Commerce Clause
issues, one of which was the threshold question of whether the target of the tax
might have been considered interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Similar to the First Use Tax, the incidence of taxation under the
hydrocarbon processing tax was the first use of the hydrocarbon processing facility
in Louisiana-arguably a local event. Although the incidence of taxation was
defined in terms of a local event, the object of measure for the tax remained a
natural resource flowing in interstate commerce. However, the fact that a tax
attaches to what might be considered a local or intrastate activity does not matter
for contemporary Commerce Clause analysis purposes. The Court will focus on the
practical effect of the tax.2" Therefore, the key question is whether the
hydrocarbon processing tax would have had a substantial effect on interstate
commerce? The hydrocarbon processing tax would have imposed a new economic
burden on hydrocarbons that are transported and sold throughout the United States.
That burden would cause owners, processors and industrial end users to evaluate
and react to the added cost. Even if the natural resources were produced within
Louisiana and immediately trigger a taxable incidence under the hydrocarbon
processing scheme, the new economic burden would have drawn Commerce Clause
scrutiny.
Assuming that the subject of the hydrocarbon processing tax fell within the
ambit of the Commerce Clause, the tax would have been subject to at least three
distinct challenges. First, it is questionable whether nonresident owners of
hydrocarbons using Louisiana facilities would be deemed to have substantial nexus
with the state of Louisiana. Despite the impressive list of events that would have
triggered the tax, the initial use which would have triggered it for nonresidents was
the metering of their product as it entered the state. Should Louisiana be permitted
244. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 120-125 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 140-147 and accompanying text.
20011
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
to parse into local events the commercial infrastructure necessary to bring
commodities of vital national economic interest to the national market and impose
a $700 million annual tax to access the local market? Would a court be persuaded
that this tax amounts to prohibited state regulation of the national economy? One
should also consider the imposition of a collection responsibility on nonresident
purchasers of the commodity as it flows through the state. A court might have been
compelled to extend the Quill "physical presence" requirement to the hydrocarbon
processing tax and declare that accessing the nation's oil and gas delivery
infrastructure is truly "a discrete realm of commercial activity that is free from
interstate taxation.
241
Second, it is questionable whether the hydrocarbon processing tax would have
been considered "fairly apportioned." The incidence of the tax was closely
interwoven with the interstate movement of the taxed product. A number of the "tax
triggering" events would have taken place in every jurisdiction through which the
product passes on its journey to the market place. The practical effect would be a tax
on the transportation or on the product itself, and each state would appear to have the
same rights to tax the activity of transportation of the product or the product itself as
it reached its state lines. A court should consider whether the lack of an
apportionment scheme places impermissible multiple burdens on the same activity.
Finally, the hydrocarbon processing tax appeared to have a discriminatory effect
on the operation of the tax on refined products. The question is whether the taxing of
refined products at the rate of 1.15 times the crude oil rate would be justifiable? It is
reasonable to assume that all hydrocarbons produced in Louisiana would have been
subject to the processing tax before they could be converted into a refined product.
Therefore, the refined products produced in Louisiana would not have bome the
incremental rate, but out of state refined products entering the state would have
suffered the tax. The practical effect of the higher rate on refined products, therefore,
captured refined products coming from neighboring states. Refinery operations in
neighboring states are substantially similar entities to refinery operations in Louisiana.
Since the hydrocarbon processing tax did not contain a stated purpose for the higher
rate on imported refined products, a court would have inquired as to the justification
for the apparent discrimination.
The hydrocarbon processing tax also would have to overcome the Supremacy
Clause hurdle presented by a potential conflict with OCSLA. The hydrocarbon
processing tax would have been imposed on oil and natural gas severed from the OCS
and transported into the state of Louisiana. Under the proposed legislation, the tax
was to be imposed in lieu of severance taxes on certain products. If it were assumed
that the hydrocarbon processing tax was a tax on the hydrocarbons produced from the
OCS, arguably the tax operated as a severance tax based on its practical effect and
was in violation of OCSLA's ban on state taxation.248 Indeed, Bel Oil supports the
conclusion that,4 9 if processing is necessary to bring the natural resources produced
247. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
249. See supra note 112.
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on the OCS to the national market, the processing tax would have been equated to a
production tax and would be forbidden by OCSLA.
Perhaps the most intriguing constitutional inquiry arises from the Import-
Export Clause. As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in United States v.
International Business Machines Corp., it has yet to ."reach the question of the
applicability of the Michelin approach when a state directly taxes imports or exports
in transit.""'25 The hydrocarbon processing tax implicated at least two of the
Michelin evils: (1) commercial relations with foreign governments and (2) a
seaboard state taxing nonresident owners of commodities merely flowing through
the state to other states not situated as favorably geographically. Might the
hydrocarbon processing tax have presented the United States Supreme Court with
the opportunity to decide the legal efficacy of the Import-Export Clause "in-transit"
jurisprudence? Arguably, the tax was actually a property tax on goods still in
import.
III. CONCLUSION
The proponents of the hydrocarbon processing tax have attempted to avoid the
federal constitutional infirmities of the First Use Tax and to address the issues
raised by CWEL. The past quarter century of decisions from the United States
Supreme Court suggest a trend of expanding state power to tax commerce. Further,
decisions such as Complete Auto Transit and Michelin demonstrate a shift away
from rigid formalism toward a practical effect approach in analyzing whether a
particular state tax violates the underlying principles of the Constitution.
Nevertheless, decisions such as Quill and International Business Machines Corp.
reflect the Supreme Court's reluctance to overturn bright-line tests when they
support the underlying constitutional principles challenged.
If a hydrocarbon processing tax bill is ever signed into law, a constitutional
challenge is certain. Despite efforts to draft the bill around the infirmities of the
First Use Tax, the practical effect of a hydrocarbon processing tax remains as a
state taxation of nonresidents moving a commodity of vital economic interest in
commerce-a lightning rod for the convergence of constitutional concerns and
policies.
250. 517 U.S. 854, 862, 116 S. Ct. 1793, 1804 (1996).
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